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Adapting to Crisis. Accounting Information Systems during the Weimar 
Hyperinflation 
 
German corporations are characterized as adaptable in the face of 
numerous traumatizing events during the twentieth century. This 
article explores how firms adapted their accounting information 
systems during the hyperinflation of the 1920s. It suggests that 
responses to the crisis focused on system elements identified as key 
to continuing operations. Initially, firms amended selling and 
purchasing arrangements, modified financial reporting, and shifted 
managerial reporting to non-monetary information. As inflation 
accelerated, human resources were diverted to maintaining critical 
functions, especially those related to remunerating labor. While 
some elements of accounting systems fell into disrepair, there were 
also examples of innovation. 
Keywords: accounting information systems, adaptation, 
hyperinflation, Germany 
 
Having reviewed German business history during the nineteenth and twentieth 
centuries Werner Plumpe observed that a distinguishing feature is the comparative 
stability of corporate structures in the face of numerous crises and upheavals.1 He 
reflected that this suggested “an amazing capacity to adapt” and argued that historians 
have paid insufficient attention to exploring the sources of corporate continuity.2 This 
continuity in “a national history marked by violent, destructive political change” 
represents a “classic dilemma of German history”.3 In this article, we seek to explore 
the adaptability of German entities when confronted by one of the foremost crises of 
the interwar years, the Weimar hyperinflation of 1923. We focus on the response of 
entities to the threat that this trauma posed to the operation of accounting information 
                                                             
1 Werner Plumpe, German Economic and Business History in the 19th and 20th Centuries (London, 
2016), 1. 
2 ibid., 1-2. 
3 Jeffrey R. Fear, Organizing Control. August Thyssen and the Construction of German Corporate 
Management (Cambridge, Massachusetts, 2005), 2. 
 3 
systems. These systems were especially vulnerable to the effects of rapidly changing 
prices.  
By examining the Weimar hyperinflation the study responds to the long-
standing call to explore the impact of crises on German businesses, particularly on 
individual firms during the aforementioned years of almost perpetual disturbance.4 
Indeed, the business environment of the first half of the twentieth century has been 
associated with Hobsbawm’s ‘Age of Catastrophe’.5 During this period German firms 
experienced two world wars, the replacement of a constitutional monarchy by a 
democratic republic, hyperinflation, economic depression, a banking crisis, the rise of 
National Socialism and the Hitlerian state. Businesses were consequently exposed to a 
succession of socio-economic, military and political disturbances that potentially 
impacted on corporate stability. 6 Plumpe contends that the challenge for corporate 
historians is to seek explanations for the ability of German corporations to manage 
such risks and emerge from crises intact.7 Examining everyday business practices and 
unveiling their inner workings and routines offers one route to finding explanations.8  
                                                             
4 See Wolfram Fischer, “Some Recent Developments of Business History in Germany, Austria and 
Switzerland”, Business History Review 37, no. 4 (Winter 1963): 416-436; Knut Borchardt, 
“Wirtschaftliche Krisen als Gegenstand der Unternehmensgeschichte”, Zeitschrift für 
Unternehmensgeschichte 22, no. 2 (1977): 81-90; Peter Hüttenberger, “Strukturentwicklungen in 
Deutschen Wirtschaftsregionen vom 19. Jahrhundert his Ende der 1960er Jahre,” Zeitschrift für 
Unternehmensgeschichte 34, no. 3(1989), 152-168; and Harald Wixforth, “Unternehmensstrategien in 
der Krise? Die Krise des Norddeutschen Lloyds nach der Inflation und ihre Bewältigung,“ Zeitschrift 
für Unternehmensgeschichte 63, no. 2 (2018), 275-306. 
5 Hartmut Berghoff, Jürgen Kocka, and Dieter Ziegler, “Introduction: Business in the Age of 
Extremes,” in Business in the Age of Extremes: Essays in Modern German and Austrian Economic 
History, eds. Hartmut Berghoff, Jürgen Kocka, and Dieter Ziegler (Cambridge, Mass., 2013), 1-12. 
6 Geoffrey Jones and Christina Lubinski, “Managing Political Risk in Global Business: Beiersdorf 
1914-1990,” Enterprise & Society 13, no. 1 (March 2012): 85-119”; and Christopher Kobrak, Per H. 
Hansen, and Christopher Kopper, “Business, Political Risk, and Historians in the Twentieth Century,” 
in European Business, Dictatorship, and Political Risk, 1920-1945, eds. Christopher Kobrak, and Per 
H. Hansen (New York, 2004), 3-21. 
7 Plumpe, German Economic and Business History, 101. 
8 ibid., 4; Fear, Organizing, 2-5, 28-29, 787. 
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In the current study we gain such insights through the operation of accounting, 
which has been identified by Fear as an especially useful conduit for “entering into 
the life of an organization”. 9 By focusing on accounting information systems the 
article chimes with the observation that while business historians have investigated 
corporate transformations in relation to transport, communication, production and 
marketing, much less attention has been devoted to changes in accounting and capital 
markets.10 Fear and Kobrak contend that the combination of world war followed by 
hyperinflation had a ruinous impact on the development of the German equity 
market. 11  Of particular significance to the current investigation, Fear and Kobrak 
suggest that “the hyperinflation destroyed attempts to initiate good accounting 
practices”.12 
The German hyperinflation represents a salient event in the history of 
accounting for price level changes.13 In its day the crisis generated “a change in the 
mindsets of German accountants”.14 Contemporaries suggested that the difficulties 
confronting accountants in Germany were so acute that they are “worthy of study by 
accountants of all other countries”. 15 The episode unleashed enduring debates and 
inspired theoretical contributions that established Germany as a leading center of 
                                                             
9 Fear, Organizing, 9, 35. 
10 Jeffrey R. Fear and Christopher Kobrak, “Diverging Paths: Accounting for Corporate Governance in 
America and Germany,” Business History Review 80, no. 1 (Spring 2006): 1-48.  
11 ibid., 16-17. 
12 ibid., 26. 
13 See Maurice Moonitz, Changing Prices and Financial Reporting (Arthur Andersen & Co lecture 
series) (Champaign, Ill., 1973); Stephen A. Zeff, “Response to Inflation, Accounting Principles, and 
the Accounting Profession,” in Economic Calculation Under Inflation, ed. Helen E. Schultz (Liberty 
Press, 1976), 135-148; Stephen A. Zeff, “The Impact of Inflation on Accounting: A Review of the 
Response of the Accounting Profession in Ten Countries,” Management Decision 14, no. 3 (1976): 
109-116; Richard V. Mattessich, Major Concepts and Problems of Inflation Accounting, Study Paper 
#2 (Vancouver, 1983); and David Tweedie and Geoffrey Whittington, The Debate on Inflation 
Accounting (Cambridge, 1984). 
14 Sebastian Hoffmann and Dominic Detzen, “The regulation of asset valuation in Germany,” 
Accounting History 18, no. 3 (2013): 367-389. 
15 Henry W. Sweeney, “Effects of Inflation on German Accounting,” The Journal of Accountancy 43 
(March 1927): 180-191. 
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accounting thought.16 While a number of studies have discussed the experience and 
impact of the hyperinflation on German business accounting, there has tended to be 
an emphasis on theoretical developments and on the end products of the accounting 
regimen - the financial statements, 17 particularly of banks. 18  However, accounting 
information systems extend well beyond financial reporting.19 Accordingly, a holistic 
notion of accounting systems is adopted in the current investigation, one that 
embraces elements that our sources suggest were particularly disturbed by the effects 
of hyperinflation, namely: business operations, transaction processing, control, and 
reporting. 20  In contrast to the majority of previous studies on the organizational 
impacts of the hyperinflation that focus on a single corporation, we draw on the 
                                                             
16 See Hans-Ulrich Küpper and Richard V. Mattessich, “Twentieth century accounting research in the 
German language area,” Accounting, Business & Financial History 15, no. 3 (2005): 345-410 and 
Dieter Schneider, “Germany,” In The History of Accounting – An International Encyclopedia, eds. 
Michael Chatfield and Richard Vangermeersch (New York/London, 1996), 278-280. 
17 See Fear and Kobrak, “Diverging Paths”. The focus on theory and financial reporting is evident in 
the work of historians of the German hyperinflation who touch on accounting-related themes. See, for 
example, Gerald D. Feldman, Carl-Ludwig Holtfrerich, Gerhard A. Ritter, and Peter-Christian Witt, 
eds, The German Inflation Reconsidered. A Preliminary Balance (New York, 1982); Carl-Ludwig 
Holtfrerich, The German Inflation 1914-1923: Causes and Effects in International Perspective (New 
York, 1986); Karsten Laursen and Jorgen Pedersen, The German Inflation, 1918-1923 (Amsterdam 
1964); Steven B. Webb, Hyperinflation and Stabilization in Weimar Germany (Oxford, 1989); Eric E. 
Rowley, Hyperinflation in Germany. Perceptions of a Process (Aldershot, 1994); and Frederick 
Taylor, The Downfall of Money. Germany’s Hyperinflation and the Destruction of the Middle Class 
(London, 2014). Economic historians also tend to dwell on financial reporting. For example, 
Constantino Bresciani-Turroni, The Economics of Inflation. A Study of Currency Depreciation in Post-
War Germany (London, 1937), 220, 222, 261, 275-76; Frank D. Graham, Exchange, Prices, and 
Hyper-inflation: Germany, 1920-1923 (New York, 1967), 87-94, 276-320; Dieter Lindenlaub, 
Maschinenbauunternehmen in der deutschen Inflation 1919-1923 (Berlin/New York, 1985), 198-200, 
222; and Gerald D. Feldman, The Great Disorder. Politics, Economics, and Society in the German 
Inflation, 1914-1924 (Oxford, 1993), 299-200, 580-81, 841-42. 
18 For example, Theo Balderston, “German Banking between the Wars: The Crisis of the Credit 
Banks,” Business History Review 65, no. 3 (Autumn 1991): 554-605; and Jeffrey R. Fear and R. Daniel 
Wadhwani, “Populism and Political Entrepreneurship: The Universalization of German Savings Banks 
and the Decline of U.S. Savings Banks, 1908-1934,” in Business in the Age of Extremes: Essays in 
Modern German and Austrian Economic History, eds. Hartmut Berghoff, Jürgen Kocka, and Dieter 
Ziegler (Cambridge, Mass., 2013), 94-118. Non-banking studies include: Boris Barth, “Die Anfänge 
des Gerling-Konzerns 1904 bis 1926. Der ‘Outsider’ Robert Gerling, das ‘Feuerkartell’ und die Lücke 
im Markt,” Zeitschrift für Unternehmensgeschichte 50, no. 1 (2005): 36-62; Hartmut Kiehling, “Die 
wirtschaftliche Situation des deutschen Einzelhandels in den Jahren 1920 bis 1923: Die Beispiele des 
Lebensmittel- und Bekleidungseinzelhandels,” Zeitschrift für Unternehmensgeschichte 41, no. 1 
(1996): 1-27; and Wixforth, “Unternehmensstrategien in der Krise?” 
19 Fear and Kobrak, “Diverging Paths”, 3. 
20 Ulric J. Gelinas, Richard B. Dull, Patrick R. Wheeler, and Mary C. Hill, Accounting Information 
Systems (Boston, 2017). 
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archives of numerous entities. Our survey includes major corporations, public and 
private entities, and firms of various sizes operating in a range of sectors (see 
Appendix).  
In the next section we elaborate on the significance of the German 
hyperinflation as a macroeconomic perturbation. Thereafter we evaluate the manner 
in which German corporations responded to the threats posed by this shock to specific 
elements of accounting information systems.  
 
The German Hyperinflation  
Perturbations represent disturbances that place systems under exceptional 
degrees of stress. Such shocks may derive from inside or outside the system. In the 
context of an accounting information system an endogenous perturbation might 
comprise a major fraud or a technological failure within the organization. An 
exogenous perturbation could arise from a natural catastrophe such as an earthquake 
or a flood, or a man-made socio-economic or political disaster such as a financial 
crash or a war. 21  In the current article the focal perturbation, hyperinflation, is 
exogenous and macro-economic. That which struck Germany in 1923 was the most 
spectacular hitherto to afflict an advanced industrial economy. Histories of the 
resultant ‘great disorder’ bear dramatic titles such as The Downfall of Money and 
                                                             
21 Greg Bankoff, “Time is of the Essence: Disasters, Vulnerability and History,” International Journal 
of Mass Emergencies and Disasters 22, no. 3 (2004): 23-42; and Benjamin Wisner, “Vulnerability as 
Concept, Model, Metric, and Tool,” in Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Natural Hazard Science, ed. 
Susan L. Cutter (New York, 2016), http://oxfordre.com/naturalhazardscience, DOI: 
10.1093/acrefore/9780199389407.013.25. 
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When Money Dies.22 At its peak in November 1923 the annual rate of inflation stood 
at 5.3 million percent.23 This had a potentially traumatic impact on the calculative, 
measuring, recording, valuation, disclosure and analytical elements of accounting 
information systems. 
Adaptive capacity, or adaptation, concerns the ability to prepare for, or 
respond to, a perturbation.24 For a business entity it relates to the capacity to cope 
with the disruptive effects of trauma and to make adjustments to enable the continuing 
operation of systems.25 Ability to adapt, particularly during a period of crisis, is a 
component of organizational capability.26 In the current investigation we focus on the 
adaptations and adjustments to accounting information systems that were pursued by 
corporations in response to the harmful effects of hyperinflation. It was only near the 
end of the perturbation that the state seriously considered the accounting implications 
of hyperinflation with the result that businesses were left to design their own coping 
strategies.27  
Consistent with the aforementioned call for investigations of everyday 
business practices we investigate whether and how businesses adapted accounting 
information systems to the hyperinflationary disturbance. To achieve this we 
                                                             
22 Feldman, The Great Disorder; Taylor, The Downfall; Adam Fergusson, When Money Dies. The 
Nightmare of the Weimar Hyper-inflation (London, 2015). 
23 Statistisches Reichsamt, Die deutsche Inflation: Zahlen zur Geldentwertung in Deutschland 1914 bis 
1923. Wirtschaft und Statistik. Sonderheft (Berlin, 1925), 6-10. 
24 Nathan L. Engle, “Adaptive Capacity and its Assessment,” Global Environmental Change 21 (2011): 
647-656; Gilberto C. Gallopin, “Linkages Between Vulnerability, Resilience, and Adaptive Capacity,” 
Global Environmental Change 16, no. 3 (August 2006): 293-303. 
25 Engle, “Adaptive Capacity”. 
26 Alfred D. Chandler, “Organizational Capabilities and the Economic History of the Industrial 
Enterprise,” Journal of Economic Perspectives 6, no. 3 (1992): 79-100; and Daniel A. Levinthal, 
“Organizational Capabilities in Complex Worlds,” in The Nature and Dynamics of Organizational 
Capabilities, eds. Giovanni Dosi, Richard R. Nelson, and Sidney Winter (Oxford, 2001), 363-81. 
27 The most significant statutory intervention came in December 1923 (and is discussed later). A law 
passed in early 1923 concerned shielding firms from inflation-induced tax burdens. See Wilhelm 
Gerloff and Georg Strutz, Steuerwirtschaft und Steuerrecht im Zeichen der Geldentwertung (Berlin, 
1923). 
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consulted surviving documents relating to the period 1919-1925, retained by German 
corporations and public repositories.28 Access was gained to the archives of more than 
30 public and private firms, most of which were corporations. It should be noted that 
our findings are unlikely to be representative of the experience of businesses 
organized as partnerships (Personengesellschaften) and sole proprietors 
(Einzelunternehmen). 
As the Appendix shows these firms operated in a range of sectors. References 
to archival material in the article are also explained in this appendix. The records 
consulted comprised annual reports, ledgers, journals, memorials, cost and profit 
calculations, audit and management reports, board minutes, personal and official 
correspondence, business and employment contracts, and personal notes.  
Our analysis of the adaptive ability of corporations focuses on the elements of 
accounting information systems that our sources suggest were most sensitive to the 
effects of hyperinflation: business operations, transactions processing, control, 
financial reporting and managerial reporting.29 
Business Operations 
Fundamental business activities such as making sales and buying goods and 
services, and remunerating labor, operate in tandem with systems for the processing 
of financial information.30  
                                                             
28 Note that liquidations, mergers, fires, floods, world war and the partition of Germany have all 
resulted in the loss or destruction of numerous business records since the early 1920s. The repositories 
we accessed often held highly fragmented records for our period. 
29 For elements of accounting information systems see Ulric J. Gelinas, Richard B. Dull, Patrick 
Wheeler, and Mary C. Hill, Accounting Information Systems, 11th ed., (Boston, Mass., 2017). 
30 Gelinas et al, Accounting Information Systems, 11. 
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Sales and purchases. The primary sources indicate that selling and purchasing 
activities were vulnerable to the impact of hyperinflation. Rising prices between the 
time when an order was placed and the receipt of the corresponding goods or services 
disrupted processing. Given the fundamental importance of this activity to the going 
concern status of the corporation, swift adaptation was necessary. When inflation 
began to accelerate some corporations, such as E. Merck, Carl Zeiss, Chemische 
Fabrik auf Actien (vorm. E. Schering) and Bayer, began invoicing in a variety of 
foreign currencies rather than the German Mark.  
Initially some of these responses were problematic. Responding to the 
devaluation and high volatility of the German Mark in early 1920, E. Merck began 
invoicing South American customers in US Dollars. As the US Dollar appreciated in 
subsequent months, it became increasingly difficult for these customers to source this 
foreign currency. Following the substantial impairment of the related receivables, E. 
Merck returned to invoicing in German Marks at the end of 1920.31 From late 1922 
the firm calculated prices for overseas customers in Swiss Francs and thereby 
achieved stabilization in their overseas sales accounts. Domestic prices were 
calculated in paper-marks until August 1923, when intense inflationary pressures 
encouraged the firm to switch pricing to gold-marks.32 In other entities issues arose as 
to whether to channel export sales through overseas subsidiaries (Kaffee HAG). Firms 
that could not boast such group structures often used close business partners in other 
countries as vehicles for making and receiving payments in a foreign currency 
(Deutsche Kugellagerfabrik) or opened accounts with smaller banks overseas (Kübler 
                                                             
31 Merck-Archiv, sig. F3/24 
32 Constant shifting between currencies at the height of the crisis has been described as “hermaphroditic 
accounting and pricing”. See Gerald D. Feldman, Iron and Steel in the German Inflation 1916-1923 
(Princeton, 1977), 397. 
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& Niethammer). Significantly, the Rentenmark, which became additional legal tender 
in Germany from November 1923, does not feature prominently in the surviving 
records. The firms we examined continued to use either paper- or gold-mark, or a 
foreign currency to operate their accounting information systems. 
Another adaptation was to introduce sophisticated payment arrangements in 
contracts and terms of trade. MAN, a manufacturing firm, used a price adjustment 
clause to ensure that customers bore price increases between ordering and delivery, 
based on a US Dollar multiplier. By the end of July 1923 this multiplier had increased 
to 17,700 and was adjusted weekly. From August 1923 onwards MAN invoiced in 
gold-marks and gave customers no more than eight days to pay their bills.33 Having 
explored almost all proposed theoretical anchors to adjust for inflation, 
Gutehoffnungshütte experimented with a number of price adjustment clauses based 
on increases in materials and labor costs as measured by a firm-specific prime cost 
index, foreign currencies, and the price of gold. None of these proved manageable or 
effective.34 
Inflation adjustments were also made in relation to purchasing. At Th. 
Goldschmidt, from 1922, the amounts stated in raw material accounts were no longer 
only recorded in marks, but also converted to the foreign currency of the country from 
which the materials were sourced. The firm argued that this enabled the better 
monitoring of ‘real’ (that is, non-inflated) changes in the price of these materials.35 
Inflation adjustment clauses were especially important in contracts for the acquisition 
of assets that took time to complete. An example is Deutsche Kugellagerfabrik. Their 
                                                             
33 MAN Truck & Bus Historisches Archiv München, sig. 1.1.3. 
34 Rheinisch Westfälisches Wirtschaftsarchiv, Abt. 130, sig. 300002/2. 
35 Firmenarchiv Evonik Industries, Bestand Th. Goldschmidt AG, Bericht der Thermit-Abteilung 1921 
und 1922. 
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acquisition of a property for 1.15 million marks in January 1923 required an 
immediate payment of 600,000 marks but the remainder, due when all relevant 
approvals were granted, would be paid in a foreign currency.36 
The management of debtors and creditors was also vulnerable to the effects of 
hyperinflation. Indeed, the relationship between debtor and creditor was “turned 
upside down” and the foremost rule of business became to minimize credit offered to 
customers and exploit credit opportunities available to oneself.37 In an internal memo 
to the board the chief accountant at Gutehoffnungshütte complained about the 
additional administrative burden surrounding this activity. Not only did the volume of 
enquiries about the balance on accounts increase, these were not easily resolvable by 
reference to the increasingly complex records. Debtors had to be constantly reminded 
of payments due and, if necessary, interest penalties had to be calculated and 
enforced. Reciprocally, complex negotiations took place with creditors who sought 
compensation for the devaluation of their claims against the firm. To make his point, 
the chief accountant quantified the additional work performed during the period of 
hyperinflation. In a review of financial year 1923/1924 he reported that the 
accounting department had processed 78% more accounts and related documents 
compared with 1913/14.38 This case suggests that the firm adapted to the additional 
burden of managing debtors and creditors, and ensured the ongoing operation of the 
department, by devoting more labor to the activity. Although this was also a period of 
acquisition and corporate restructuring for Gutehoffnungshütte, the number of clerks 
                                                             
36 Sächsisches Wirtschaftsarchiv, U63, sig. 113. 
37 Bernd Widdig, Culture and Inflation in Weimar Germany (Berkeley, 2001), 14; also Holtfrerich, The 
German Inflation, 70. 
38 Rheinisch Westfälisches Wirtschaftsarchiv, Abt. 130, sig. 300108/70. 
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employed in its central accounting department increased from 36 in 1913/14 to 58 in 
July 1923. 
Remuneration. The archives indicate that corporations were highly vulnerable 
to the impact of hyperinflation on the payment of wages and salaries. Such sensitivity 
emanated from the potential for labor unrest given the impact of rapidly rising prices 
on real earnings, and the consequences of labor discontent for the continuity of 
business operations. During the hyperinflation “the value of the pay packet sank in the 
time it took to cover the distance between the wages office and the shops”.39 Frequent 
changes to employment contracts were necessary to adjust salaries and pensions. By 
way of illustration, the monthly gross salary of Mr. Albrecht, a white-collar worker 
with paper manufacturer Kübler & Niethammer increased from 2,400 paper-marks in 
January 1922 to 9,534,684,695,000,000 in November 1923.40 The recollections of a 
payroll clerk at Chemische Fabrik auf Actien (vorm. E. Schering) are insightful.41 
Reporting on the filling of huge pay packets - brown bags stuffed with US dollars, 
vouchers (Notgeld) issued by other firms and tons of paper-marks of small 
denomination - she exemplifies regular complaints by payroll personnel about the 
physical challenges of preparing and distributing cash wages.  
Firms also adapted to the perturbation by remunerating employees more 
frequently. From August 1923 Kübler & Niethammer recalculated and paid salaries 
five times a week. They also responded to shortages of paper-marks by making 
payments with alternative currencies. When a shortage of cash arose at Hoesch in 
August 1923 the workers were issued with vouchers (Notgeld). If alternative currency 
                                                             
39 William Guttmann and Patricia Meehan, The Great Inflation. Germany 1919-23 (London, 1976), 79. 
40 Sächsisches Wirtschaftsarchiv, U47, sig. 998, 999. 
41 Schering Archiv/Bayer AG, sig. B1-87. 
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could not be utilized, firms might ration what was available. When E. Merck was 
short of liquidity, it prioritized the payment of wages and salaries according to 
employees’ marital status.  
Others adapted by meeting their obligations to labor in alternative ways. 
BASF created its own unit of currency for remuneration purposes. From August 1923 
wage payments were made in the form of ‘fixed mark’ (Festmark) vouchers that 
employees could exchange for paper-marks at the company cash office. Each day a 
spot exchange rate (based on the US Dollar) for fixed to paper-marks was published 
by the firm. In this way employees were shielded from the devastating effects of 
inflation. Internal correspondence between the firm’s administrative department and 
the board suggests that operating and accounting for payroll was more manageable 
under this regime, and that labor productivity increased because employees worried 
less about converting worthless paper-marks into goods.42  
Corporations also adapted to the substantial burdens of remunerating 
employees by changing their internal organization. At Chemische Fabrik auf Actien 
(vorm. E. Schering), for example, a new human resources department was created on 
1 January 1923. This commenced with six staff but was doubled in size as the crisis 
worsened. Sources also indicate that existing payroll staff worked longer hours during 
the hyperinflation.43  
Transactions Processing 
Archival material suggests that the transactions processing element of 
accounting information systems was highly vulnerable to the impacts of 
                                                             
42 BASF Unternehmensarchiv, sig. A.8.4./7. 
43 Schering Archiv/Bayer AG, sig. B1-87. 
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hyperinflation. Sensitivity centered on two constituent activities: calculation and 
recording.  
Calculation. The volatility of exchange rates in Germany during the 
hyperinflation meant that calculations relating to foreign currency transactions were 
increasingly complex and more frequent. Calculative activity consumed substantial 
accounting and clerical labor. In February 1923, for example, BASF concluded that 
foreign currency translation “occupies a huge number of staff for eight days per 
month and requires more and more time as the numerals grow further”.44 Many of the 
surviving accounting records relating to foreign currency calculations are ‘messy’. 
They contain miscalculations, erasures and entries in different colored inks.  
Banking was especially impacted by the expansion of calculative activity 
during the crisis. Bank clerks complained about performing calculations involving 
unmanageable numbers.45 At the Bank für Handel und Industrie daily calculations of 
interest on client accounts became a huge undertaking, not only because of the 
increased frequency and magnitude of the task, but also because, from November 
1923, amounts were translated into US dollars. The latter generated some unwieldy 
accountings. Investigating client complaints of miscalculation also consumed much 
clerical labor.46  
As indicated earlier, the calculation of wages and salaries was also vulnerable 
to the impact of the focal perturbation. Inscriptions relating to the calculation of 
hourly and monthly wage rates at E. Merck are indicative of mounting disorder as the 
                                                             
44 BASF Unternehmensarchiv, sig. A.1.6./11. 
45 Widdig, Culture, 97-98. 
46 Firmenarchiv Commerzbank, sig. HAC 500 1436-2000. 
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inflation worsened in 1923.47 The documents of almost all firms studied indicate that 
payroll calculations were rendered more complex by adjustments to wages for 
inflation. These adjustments were often the result of agreements with labor unions 
anxious to preserve the purchasing power of their members, or were negotiated 
between management and labor within an entity, or stipulated by the board.48 The 
board minutes of the steel producer Hoesch describe how inflation adjustments to the 
salaries of white-collar workers from April 1923 were linked to the price of the raw 
coal needed to heat the furnaces. In December of that year the add-on to wages for 
inflation was 73.5 trillion percent.49 Carl Zeiss calculated a firm-specific inflation 
index using the base year 1914. This index was based on the price of food and other 
essentials. It formed the basis for wages and salaries multipliers, which, at the height 
of the crisis, were altered every other day.50  
Entities adapted to the impact of hyperinflation on calculative activity by (i) 
performing calculations more frequently, (ii) rationalizing calculation, and (iii) 
devoting more labor to the task. In relation to the first of these, as the crisis mounted, 
wages and salary payments became increasingly linked to a stable unit such as the US 
Dollar or gold-mark and adjustments were made more frequently. Documents at the 
Darmstädter und Nationalbank (Danat) reveal that, as inflation increased, the salaries 
of directors were corrected retrospectively every month from February 1923. These 
calculations became fortnightly in August 1923 and, from October 1923 every-other-
                                                             
47 Merck-Archiv, sig. F3/27 
48 Graham, Exchange, 90-93. 
49 Thyssenkrupp Konzernarchiv, Hoesch-Archiv, sig. H7. 
50 Firmenarchiv Carl Zeiss Jena, BACZ 781. 
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day. 51  Indicative of the challenge of making such frequent calculations, the 
underlying documents became increasingly disorderly. 
In relation to the second response, efforts were made in some firms to simplify 
aspects of calculative practice. In an attempt to ease the burden of calculating wages 
and salaries, in September 1923 Gutehoffnungshütte decided to round to the nearest 
million marks. From November 1923, the price of coal supplied to its workers was no 
longer quoted in marks at all, but in working hours, and was ‘paid’ accordingly.52 As 
a result of the ever-increasing complexity of wages and salaries calculations relating 
to different classes, types, and levels of experience of employees, Bayer began to 
simplify their payroll calculations as early as 1920 by discontinuing complex wage 
supplements.53 
The third adaptation was the most common. The supply of labor performing 
calculative functions was increased by employing more clerical staff and/or, as at 
Bayer, transferring existing employees between departments. Previous commentators 
have noted a shifting ratio of clerical to manual labor as firms attempted to cope with 
complex and voluminous calculations. 54  The archival evidence confirms this 
observation. At banks, such as Commerz- und Privatbank, Dresdner Bank, Deutsche 
Bank, Disconto-Gesellschaft and Norddeutsche Bank, the increased work associated 
with performing routine calculations demanded a significant increase in personnel and 
office space. At Deutsche Bank there was an “enormous increase of employees at the 
height of the inflation”.55 Indeed, the number of staff employed in the banking sector 
                                                             
51 Firmenarchiv Commerzbank, sig. HAC 500 890/890-1999. 
52 Rheinisch Westfälisches Wirtschaftsarchiv, Abt. 130, sig. 300104/6. 
53 Bayer AG Corporate History & Archives, sig. BAL 215-002. 
54 Graham, Exchange, 246-47; Guttmann and Meehan, The Great Inflation, 83. 
55 Lothar Gall, Gerald D. Feldman, Harold James, Carl-Ludwig Holtfrerich, and Hans E Büschgen, The 
Deutsche Bank 1870-1995 (London, 1995), 198, 203-205. 
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in Germany increased fourfold between 1913 and 1923. 56  At Commerz- und 
Privatbank many investment decisions were motivated by the need to obtain the 
personnel and office space necessary to perform additional work during the 
inflation.57 
Although primary evidence suggests that the responses of firms to the problem 
of calculation often proved effective, a number of examples indicate that they were 
insufficient to address the disruptive impact of the crisis at its height. On occasion the 
response was to discontinue a calculative activity deemed unessential to business 
survival. On 2 October 1923 the treasury accounting department at 
Gutehoffnungshütte reported to the board that it had “given up” because it was 
“impossible for us to recalculate how the cash inflows (on our current accounts) of 
approximately M 190,897,700,000, are composed”.58 Some entities also considered 
whether it was more economic to discontinue calculations than incur the cost of 
employing additional clerical labor to perform them. For example, in December 1922 
BASF questioned the necessity of continuous translation of foreign currency for 
purposes of running the Interessengemeinschaft (Erweiterte I.G.), given that this 
would require them to engage ten additional clerks, and potentially more in other 
member firms.59 In many cases, sheets containing calculations of wage costs reveal 
increasing signs of systemic stress in 1923. Cancellations, erasures, overwriting, and 
check ticks became common.  
Recording. The problem of continuing calculative activity during the 
hyperinflation was mirrored in the recording of transactions. The inscriptions made in 
                                                             
56 Taylor, The Downfall, 281. 
57 Firmenarchiv Commerzbank, sig. Geschäftsbericht 1923. 
58 Rheinisch Westfälisches Wirtschaftsarchiv, Abt. 130, sig. 300070/10. 
59 BASF Unternehmensarchiv, sig. A.1.6./11. 
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surviving account books evidence the frustrations associated with this activity. Huge 
numbers were entered in books of original entry and in general ledgers, extending 
well beyond pre-printed column widths (Figure 1). At Fried. Krupp AG columns 
intended for decimals were used to add multiple zeros to the numbers. In September 
1923 columns were headed ‘millions’ of marks. One month later ‘millions’ was 
scored out and replaced with ‘billions’. At E. Merck the transition from recording in 
paper-marks to gold-marks involved the considerable burden of making book entries 
on each basis, as did bookkeeping where customers were invoiced in a foreign 
currency.60  
(FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE) 
The demanding nature of transactions recording was exemplified in a 
reflective memo, prepared in 1943 by the head of accounting at Krupp-Gusonwerke. 
The memorialist reflected that accountants made entries in books and ledgers that 
weighed “almost half a hundredweight”. 61  Inscribing inflated paper-mark values 
meant a significant additional workload because the forms, columns, and rows in the 
books were not configured to accommodate such large numerals.  
A contemporary commentator suggested that there was little that firms could 
do in response to the problem of transactions recording, other than assume a more 
systematic and structured approach to keeping their books under inflationary 
conditions.62 Much advice focused on maintaining clarity by distinguishing entries in 
different currencies by the use of colored inks. At Farbwerke Hoechst, for example, 
revenues were recorded in gold-marks (green ink) and paper-marks (black ink) from 
                                                             
60 Merck-Archiv, sig. F3/27. 
61 Historisches Archiv Krupp, sig. WA 4/2841. 
62 See Josef Nertinger, Goldmark-Buchführung und Goldmark-Bilanzen (Stuttgart, 1922), 12-14. 
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1923. 63  Replacing leather bound books with loose-leaf files was suggested as a 
palliative, because pre-printed sheets could be inserted as necessary and there was no 
restriction on the number of transactions that could be recorded in a single book.  
The bookkeepers at Krupp-Gusonwerke initially adapted by adding extra 
pencil-drawn columns to the books. Later, the firm’s printing shop was ordered to 
produce customized proforma sheets. At Kaffee HAG mechanical methods were 
resorted to. Following a successful trial in their Swiss subsidiary, Ruf bookkeeping 
machines were introduced in late 1922 to accommodate the additional workload in 
processing and recording transactions.64 As with the additional burden of calculation, 
the need to enter massive numbers in additional columns using different writing 
instruments was addressed by increasing the productivity of existing staff, working 
overtime, and the engagement of more personnel.  
As was the case with calculative activity, such attempts to maintain 
transaction recording did not always demonstrate an ability to cope. Errors were 
inevitably made when large numbers were aggregated in memorial books and posted 
to ledgers. Surviving account books are replete with crossings out, overwriting and 
cluttered inscriptions. 65  When the inflationary trauma compounded a crisis in the 
entity itself, the disruption to recording could become severe. In 1923 the book entries 
of Benzol-Vereinigung, which had gone into liquidation in 1922, became chaotic.66 
Debits and credits were occasionally confused and a number of accounts were in total 
disarray.  
                                                             
63 Sanofi-Hoechst Archiv, sig. H0090998. 
64 Mondelez International Archiv Bremen, sig. 00946383 R2 95 /26. 
65 Examples include BASF; Fried. Krupp AG and E. Merck. 
66 Deutsche BP Historisches Archiv, Bestand Aral, sig. AA 138. 
 20 
In some cases it appears that, despite attempts to adapt, the books were no 
longer kept at all. Routine transactions processing appeared to be in a state of 
suspension. For example, at MAN no transactions were entered in the cashbook 
relating to a deposit account from the end of 1923 to 1925. At Kaffee HAG a journal 
was closed from June 1923 to December 1923.67 From November 1923 until the new 
financial reporting regulations were implemented in 1924, no double entry 
bookkeeping was performed by Actien-Gesellschaft für Anilinfabrikation Berlin 
(Agfa), it being deemed “unnecessary and unproductive extra work”. 68  At other 
entities, such as Krupp-Gusonwerke, the additional burdens placed on accountants led 
to delays of three to four weeks in recording transactions.69 
The recording of payroll again highlighted the limits to adaptability. The 
surviving accounting records often indicate that measures such as the use of different 
colored inks failed to restore order to recording. For example, by mid-1923 the wages 
and salaries account books of the steel producer Rheinische Stahlwerke Duisburg-
Meiderich had become extremely confusing.70 There was insufficient room in the pre-
printed columns to accommodate the increasing number of zeros. From August 1923 
different ink colors were used to indicate quantities. The pre-printed columns were 
seldom used for their original purpose. Previously important, but now seemingly 
inconsequential information (such as employee status), was no longer entered. The 
books showed signs of falling into disrepair.  
Similarly, at BASF the numbers in the books relating to wages and salaries 
were annotated with numerous question marks, sub-calculations, and comments, 
                                                             
67 Mondelez International Archiv Bremen, no sig., “Journal von Aug. 1922”. 
68 BASF Unternehmensarchiv, sig. A.1.6./11. 
69 See Historisches Archiv Krupp, sig. WA 4/2841. 
70 thyssenkrupp Konzernarchiv, sig. RSW 4881, 4883. 
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indicative of uncertainty. 71  Bayer did not record any salaries in its ledger from 
October 1923 to January 1924.72 As an auditable record of payroll costs the account 
books of this period are unfathomable. Neither did the recruitment of additional labor 
always prove sufficient to address the negative impacts of the hyperinflation on 
recording transactions, especially of wages and salaries. The archives often contain 
references to the overworked and distressed state of the employees engaged in 
bookkeeping.73 
Control 
The effectiveness of controls over the processing of accounting information 
was also affected by the hyperinflation. Vulnerability arose from the prioritization of 
essential operations during the crisis and the consequential impacts on other elements 
of accounting information systems. For example, at Krupp-Gusonwerke the 
monitoring of customer accounts was less effectively performed given delays in filing 
relevant documents and updating the books.74  
The processing of cash was an activity where the effectiveness of controls was 
most at risk. An employee at Chemische Fabrik auf Actien (vorm. E. Schering) 
reported that internal controls surrounding the counting and distribution of cash for 
wages broke down as the system came under increasing stress.75 The movement and 
physical counting of mountains of paper-marks placed particular pressure on the 
control functions of banks. Reviewing the 1923 accounts in September 1924, the 
Bank für Handel und Industrie’s internal auditors discovered many incorrect 
                                                             
71 BASF Unternehmensarchiv, sig. A.8.4./8. 
72 Bayer AG Corporate History & Archives, sig. BAL 458-069. 
73 See, for example, Merck-Archiv, sig. F3/27; Historisches Archiv Krupp, WA 4/2841; Rheinisch 
Westfälisches Wirtschaftsarchiv, Abt. 130, sig. 300108/67. 
74 See Historisches Archiv Krupp, WA 4/2841. 
75 Schering Archiv/Bayer AG, sig. B1-87. 
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calculations and bookkeeping errors.76 The fraudulent activities of an employee at the 
Hamburg branch of the Danat bank in 1923 was attributed to the excessive burden of 
work arising from hyperinflation. His misdemeanor was rendered feasible by the 
impossibility of keeping accounts updated, the failure to balance foreign currency 
accounts, and the limited capacity to review daily account sheets.77  
Control over cash was also an issue beyond financial institutions. An internal 
audit of the Hamburg operation of the manufacturer Carl Zeiss revealed that the 
cashbooks were in a state of disrepair and some practices contradicted Carl Zeiss’ 
internal guidelines. It was also observed that a new bookkeeping system had been 
introduced in 1923, which was not authorized by the firm’s headquarters and did not 
provide for the checking of entries made by different staff.78 Hence, there was scope 
for fraud.  
There are indications that entities attempted to adapt to such risks by 
strengthening their internal controls, especially over cash. At Barmer Bank-Verein the 
board demanded in November 1923 that the directors of branches should more 
carefully monitor movements of cash and asserted that only trustworthy senior staff 
be engaged to handle it.79 Given the increasing importance of foreign currency during 
the crisis, Krupp-Gusonwerke introduced an additional layer of control: a dedicated 
accountant was appointed to monitor and record in-and outflows of foreign 
currency.80  
                                                             
76 Firmenarchiv Commerzbank, sig. HAC 500 1436-2000. 
77 Firmenarchiv Commerzbank, sig. HAC 500 13710-2000. 
78 Firmenarchiv Carl Zeiss Jena, sig. BACZ 07156. 
79 Firmenarchiv Commerzbank, sig. HAC 4-21. 
80 Historisches Archiv Krupp, WA 4/2841. 
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The evidence suggests however that some firms only concertedly adapted to 
the threats posed to their internal controls once the crisis had abated. At Hoechst a 
new liquidity monitoring system was introduced in 1924 in response to the severe 
problems of managing cash during the previous year.81 As a result of the experience 
of hyperinflation, in 1924 the board of Rheinische Stahlwerke Duisburg-Meiderich 
demanded more control over the accounting and finance functions of the firm. 
Consequently, a separate accounting department was instituted which reported 
directly to the board.82  
Financial Reporting 
Given that in 1920s Germany considerable emphasis was placed on the 
balance sheet it is not surprising that contemporaries focused on the vulnerability of 
external reporting to the impacts of hyperinflation.83 Indeed, this was the subject of 
belated intervention by the state. In December 1923, the Verordnung über 
Goldbilanzen (Regulation on Gold-mark Accounts) was passed. 84  The regulation 
stipulated that all firms required to keep books under the Handelsgesetzbuch (German 
Commercial Code) were to prepare new opening balance sheets for financial years 
beginning on or after 1 January 1924. These accounts were to be stated in gold-marks 
(an ‘artificial’ currency defined as 10/42th of the US Dollar) and their preparation 
would result in a full revaluation of all assets and liabilities.85 
Previous to the introduction of gold-mark accounts some observers contended 
that the paper-mark based data in financial statements “meant absolutely nothing and 
                                                             
81 Sanofi-Hoechst Archiv, sig. H0091026. 
82 Thyssenkrupp Konzernarchiv, sig. RSW 4021. 
83 See Fear and Kobrak, “Diverging Paths”, 26. 
84 28 December 1923. Reichsgesetzblatt (RGBl.) I 1923, 1253. 
85 Gustav Müller, Goldmark-Eröffnungsbilanz und Technik der Gold-markbuchführung (Berlin, 1924). 
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must be completely ignored”.86 Preparing the annual accounts was deemed “a waste 
of money”,87 especially as they offered limited insight to corporate performance and 
position. 88  The combination of a disruptive environment, shifting commercial 
morality, belated statutory intervention, and the move from paper- to gold-mark based 
financial reporting in 1924, also offered the potential for manipulating the financial 
statements. 89  Our emphasis is on firms’ adaptations to two financial reporting 
activities that were particularly sensitive to the effects of hyperinflation: measurement 
and disclosure.  
Measurement. The documentary evidence suggests that before the advent of 
gold-mark financial statements in 1924 it was widely recognized that generating 
meaningful numbers for reporting purposes was highly problematic. A number of 
firms attempted to adapt by shifting to alternative measurement bases. Hoechst 
translated paper-mark profits for 1922 into US dollars, but did not make any attempt 
to do so in relation to its ‘useless’ profit figure in 1923. The 1922/23 annual report of 
Hoesch contains a chart of the exchange rate of the Swedish Crown against the Mark 
to enable the reader to make sense of the paper-mark values contained therein. 
Converting paper-mark figures into foreign currencies for the purpose of preparing 
the financial statements was a widespread practice.90 
                                                             
86 Sweeney, “Effects”, 190; also Feldman, The Great Disorder, 841-42. 
87 Eugen Schmalenbach, “Die Goldmarkbilanz,” Zeitschrift für handelswissenschaftliche Forschung 18 
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88 Bresciani-Turroni, The Economics, 262. 
89 Feldman, The Great Disorder, 841-42; Fear, Organizing Control, 498; Bresciani-Turroni, The 
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90 See Wilhelm Voss, “Valuation of Fixed Assets – Historical versus Present Day Costs Including Post 
War Revaluations,” in International Congress on Accounting 1929, ed. Richard P. Brief (New 
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Unable to produce meaningful paper-mark values for their assets, banks 
generated random ‘reminder amounts’, the derivation of which were seldom 
explained. In 1922 and 1923 the Dresdner Bank and Mitteldeutsche Kreditbank 
reported ‘reminder amounts’ of one million paper-marks for own shares, investments 
and property. The only ‘actual’ values entered in its balance sheets related to 
monetary assets. Disconto-Gesellschaft reported ‘reminder amounts’ ranging from ten 
to 100 million paper-marks for own shares, investments, and equipment. Deutsche 
Bank disclosed ‘reminder values’ of 10,000 million paper-marks for property only, as 
did Norddeutsche Bank, which reported one million paper-marks per property. Other 
banks offered no values for such items. In the annual report of Commerz- und 
Privatbank for 1923 no balance sheet amounts were given for own shares, 
investments, and property, plant and equipment. The bank also explained that the 
balances disclosed for share capital and reserves merely had a ‘formal meaning’. The 
1923 balance sheet of the Barmer Bank-Verein contains no values for tangible assets 
and investments. Some non-financial entities opted to carry all (or at least some) fixed 
non-monetary assets at one, five or ten (million) paper-mark(s).91 When publishing 
their 1923 financial statements in July 1924, Chemische Fabrik von Heyden argued 
that this accounting practice was more meaningful as it would permit a focus on the 
measurement of total debt. 92  Such disruption to accounting conventions provided 
ample opportunities for uncontested earnings management.93  
More constructive responses followed the state’s requirement for gold-mark 
based financial reporting from 1924. Anticipating the regulatory change some firms 
                                                             
91 Examples include: Bayerische Motorenwerke; Chemische Fabrik von Heyden; MAN; Chemische 
Fabrik auf Actien (vorm. E. Schering); and Gutehoffnungshütte. 
92 Sächsisches Wirtschaftsarchiv, U107(AWD), sig. 014. 
93 For example, C.A.F. Kahlbaum Chemische Fabrik. See Schering Archiv/Bayer AG, sig. B0-144. 
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saw an opportunity for the early cessation of paper-mark based financial reporting. 
Kübler & Niethammer, for example, was due to prepare annual accounts at the end of 
1923. However, it provided no year-end values. Instead, it reported gold-mark values 
determined at the start of 1924. The steel producer Deutsch-Luxemburgische 
Bergwerks- und Hütten-Aktiengesellschaft, conscious that regulatory change was 
likely, produced a gold-mark balance sheet as early as October 1923. Although Fried. 
Krupp AG encountered numerous measurement issues, especially in valuing its fixed 
assets, the corporation had laid the foundations of gold-mark-based accounting early 
in 1923 by recording transactions in both paper-marks and gold-marks. The firm 
developed comprehensive guidance on paper-mark to gold-mark conversion as well 
as procedures for the treatment of conversion losses. The result was the production of 
a comparatively impressive annual report that offered fulsome explanations of how 
the numbers had been generated.  
Degussa represents another example of the benefits of a preemptive and 
systematic approach to the production of financial statements in gold-marks. The 
company publicly raised concerns about the impact of inflation on its business as 
early as August 1922. These concerns featured in their subsequent financial 
statements. Likewise, beginning in January 1924, steel producer Rheinische 
Stahlwerke Duisburg-Meiderich followed a highly systematic approach to converting 
its paper-mark accounts into gold-mark accounts, detailing the determination of 
values for every line item. The result was a comprehensible and auditable set of 
financial statements as of 30 June 1924. The steel corporation August Thyssen Hütte 
represents another instance of the seeming maintenance of order in financial reporting 
through the crisis. In early 1924 this entity produced a full set of (unpublished) 
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financial statements for 1923 in paper-marks and gold-marks. 94  The surviving 
documents indicate that considerable effort was expended in their creation.  
These responses to the problem of measurement in financial reporting suggest 
that while some firms continued to produce meaningful annual accounts by reverting 
to alternative bases of measurement (such as gold-marks or US dollars), others were 
unable to do so. The annual reports produced by entities during the years of crisis are 
testament to this. For example, the commentary attending the 1922 and 1923 annual 
reports of Hoechst conceded that the financial position of the firm could not be 
ascertained from its paper-mark balance sheets. Bayerische Motorenwerke concluded 
that, because the accounts were stated in paper-marks, the financial statements for 
1923 were completely useless. Likewise, in its annual report for 1923, Agfa stated, 
“the calculation of net assets and profit based on a paper-mark balance sheet has lost 
its economic meaning”. The firm reported that it issued financial statements for 1923 
purely in “fulfillment of [their] legal duty”. 95  Similarly, BASF, Bayer, Deutsche 
Bank, Disconto-Gesellschaft, Norddeutsche Bank and Westfälische Eisen- und 
Drahtwerke (a subsidiary of Fried. Krupp AG) stated that their financial statements 
for 1923 were only published to ensure formal compliance with the law.  
Disclosure. In relation to the second dimension of financial reporting, 
disclosure, the archival evidence indicates that a number of corporations found the 
challenges of publishing financial information in a hyperinflationary environment too 
great. A common response was to cease the production of financial statements 
altogether. The periodicity assumption in accounting was breached fundamentally in 
                                                             
94 Thyssenkrupp Konzernarchiv, sig. A 767, 768. 
95 Bayer AG Corporate History & Archives, sig. BAL 004-B17-001. 
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some cases.96 For example, the Deutsche Orientbank produced a single annual report 
for the years 1914-1923, the Deutsch-Asiatische Bank did the same for 1915-1927, 
both on the grounds of successive disruptions caused by war and hyperinflation. 
Rheinische Stahlwerke Duisburg-Meiderich released financial statements for the 
years 1922/23 (in paper-marks) and 1923/24 (in gold-marks) in a single annual report 
published in March 1925.97 At Mannesmannröhren-Werke there is no evidence that 
an annual report was produced for 1923 or that an auditor was engaged in that year.98 
The sources suggest that rather than prepare financial statements for 1923 the 
accountants at Mannesmannröhren-Werke focused on transitioning to a gold-mark 
balance sheet in July 1924.  
The transition to gold-mark balance sheets in 1924 could be used as a reason 
to reduce the volume of financial disclosures for 1923. For example, 
Mannesmannröhren-Werke and Hoechst’s 1923 paper-mark financial statements and 
Th. Goldschmidt and MAN’s annual reports for 1922/23, provided no comparative 
information for the prior year. Farbwerke Mühlheim presented an annual report for 
1923 that contained only the gold-mark opening balance sheet as at 1 January 1924 on 
the grounds that paper-mark financial statements would have provided a thoroughly 
“unreliable view of our firm’s condition”.99  
Although users of the financial statements may have sought insights to the 
disruptive effects of hyperinflation on the determination of account balances, the 
narrative disclosures contained in the annual reports for 1923 were often shorter than 
                                                             
96 See H. Meltzer, “Zur Goldmarkbilanz,” Zeitschrift für Betriebswirtschaft 1 (1924): 385-386. 
97 It should also be noted that annual reporting by some firms was also fractured by the Franco-Belgian 
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usual. Their content suggests an assumption that users were aware that these were 
extraordinary times, and that macroeconomic and political adversities were impacting 
on all businesses. Thus, no further explanation was deemed necessary.100 The primary 
sources also suggest that the volume of voluntary disclosures decreased at the height 
of the crisis. For example, Norddeutsche Bank suspended its detailed revenue report 
in 1923 because the numbers “do not constitute any basis for a comparison with prior 
years”.101  
Managerial Reporting 
It has been suggested that, given their comparatively limited exposure to 
equity capital markets, German firms emphasized the development of internal as 
opposed to external reporting after the First World War. 102 The archival evidence 
suggests that this managerial reporting was highly vulnerable to the impacts of the 
hyperinflation. In particular, the utility of financial data for longitudinal analyses of 
performance was significantly diminished by rapidly changing prices.  
Corporations adapted to the problem of managerial reporting under 
hyperinflation in two principal ways. First, years of inflation (and war) were assumed 
to be abnormal and omitted from trend analysis.103 At E. Merck the years of the First 
World War and subsequent inflation were rendered anonymous in multi-year 
analyses. The years 1922 and 1923 are simply referred to as ‘inflation’, a period of 
void. Reference years were set as 1913/14 and 1924.104 That is, before the outbreak of 
                                                             
100 Examples include: Dresdner Bank; MAN; Th. Goldschmidt; Kaffee HAG; Rheinische Stahlwerke 
Duisburg-Meiderich; and Bayerische Motorenwerke. 
101 Historisches Institut der Deutschen Bank, sig. Norddeutsche Bank Geschäftsbericht 1923. 
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war and after inflation had abated. The ‘peace mark’ (Friedensmark) or ‘peace 
values’ (Friedenswerte) that prevailed before the war were used as the basis for 
comparison. At Degussa periods in charts were labeled as either ‘time before the war’ 
(Vorkriegszeit), ‘world war’ (Weltkrieg) or ‘inflation’ (Inflation).105 
At Carl Zeiss, management reports were based on 1913 and 1924 - the years 
of war and inflation between were considered irrelevant.106 Th. Goldschmidt also 
selected 1913 as the base year when analyzing production efficiency from 1921 to 
1923.107 At MAN the longitudinal analysis of revenue data was absent for the decade 
1914-1924 as conditions were deemed ‘abnormal’. A graph of revenue over several 
decades contains two periods with no data – identified as ‘war’ and ‘inflation’.108 At 
Fried. Krupp AG the internal reporting of production information centers on 1913 and 
1925 – the years between do not feature.109  
The second response of firms to the disutility of financial data during the 
hyperinflation was to focus the analysis of performance on physical quantities rather 
than monetary measures.110 These adaptations produced data that inevitably impacted 
on corporate decision-making and, in some cases, induced changes to internal 
reporting systems. At Mannesmannröhren-Werke the weight rather than the cost of 
steel produced each month became the focus of attention. At Degussa, from 1921, 
internal sales reporting shifted from revenues earned to the weight of different metals 
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sold. Likewise, regular comparative information on different production methods was 
no longer reported in monetary amounts. Rather, the key indicator became energy 
consumption per 100 kilograms of the final product. In 1923, decisions on alternative 
production technologies for the same product, and the introduction of new products 
were made on the basis of productivity and efficiency calculations or by comparing 
monetary values with base costs of 1899 and 1913.111 At the paper manufacturer 
Kübler & Niethammer monthly statements focused on the consumption of wood in 
meters, while pulp produced and coal consumed in the manufacturing process were 
measured in kilograms. References to the cost of these raw materials were rare during 
the hyperinflation.112 At steel producer Rheinische Stahlwerke Duisburg-Meiderich 
monthly production reports did focus on costs (in paper-marks and gold-marks) until 
the autumn of 1923 when the reporting proforma was temporarily dispensed with and 
only data about quantities were recorded.113 
Other forms of management information, such as variance analysis, also 
became more complex, and as the case of Hoechst demonstrates,114 the gathering of 
the necessary information often took much longer than specified in internal reporting 
guidelines. The determination of labor costs was particularly problematic and this also 
had implications for pricing decisions. 115  Reflecting the general disruption to 
accounting information systems at Gutehoffnungshütte, even the reporting of physical 
quantities became less comprehensive in 1922/23. The narrative analysis of the firm’s 
                                                             
111 Firmenarchiv Evonik Industries, Bestand Degussa AG, Geschäftsbericht/Jahresabschluss 1921/22, 
1922/23. 
112 Sächsisches Wirtschaftsarchiv, U47, sig. 1159. 
113 Thyssenkrupp Konzernarchiv, sig. RSW 4883. 
114 Sanofi-Hoechst Archiv, sig. H0091005. 
115 Examples include E. Merck and BASF. Also Guttmann and Meehan, The Great Inflation, 61-62, 
73-74. 
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monthly management reports was initially summarized then disappeared completely 
towards the end of the reporting period.116 
The sources suggest that some capital investment decisions were also based on 
quantity rather than financial measures. At Chemische Fabrik von Heyden, for 
example, the papers of the supervisory board indicate that decisions about machinery 
purchases were based on efficiency data and expected savings of time.117 In other 
cases decisions were focused on productivity measures, foreign currency or pre-war 
values. At Degussa, for instance, the assessment of research and development 
activities shifted to productivity measures. Calculations relating to a new production 
method in one of the firm’s factories in France had to be performed twice, because 
management requested that data originally presented in paper-marks be re-presented 
in French francs.118  
Some entities attempted to continue internal reporting based on monetary 
variables. The evidence suggests that this could generate reports exhibiting a similar 
state of disrepair as found in financial reporting. An example is provided by the ‘value 
creation calculation’ performed by Thyssen & Co., which was used to assess the 
firm’s productivity and estimate overhead surcharges (Figure 2). From April 1923 the 
reports are replete with erasures, crossings-out, the use of different colored inks, 
pencil entries, and various handwritten comments and calculations, rendering them 
largely incomprehensible. While the reports were conventionally prepared in 
typescript, by August 1923 they were entirely handwritten.  
(FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE) 
                                                             
116 Rheinisch Westfälisches Wirtschaftsarchiv, Abt. 130, sig. 300108/65. 
117 Sächsisches Wirtschaftsarchiv, U107(AWD), sig. 25/2. 
118 Firmenarchiv Evonik Industries, Bestand Degussa AG, Geschäftsbericht/Jahresabschluss 1921/22. 
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Although some firms discussed problems of cost allocation, there is no 
evidence in the primary sources that cost accounting systems were fundamentally 
adapted during the perturbation.119 The archives refer to the high uncertainty of future 
estimates, the increasingly large numbers to process manually, 120  and delays in 
producing the usual reports or their incompleteness.121 There is little suggestion of 
responses to these issues. Costing for new phenomena during the hyperinflation, such 
as issuing Notgeld, was rather simplistic, without attempts to split costs into fixed and 
variable. 122  Likely, firms concluded that the distortion of monetary values during 
hyperinflation was an insurmountable problem, and that non-monetary information on 
quantities and productivities was more useful to management. 
Conclusion 
During the ‘Age of Catastrophe’ businesses in Germany were exposed to a 
succession of economic, military, social and political disturbances. We have 
examined how firms responded to one such perturbation, the Weimar hyperinflation. 
Given its potential for offering compelling insights to everyday organizational 
practices, we have focused on the adaptability of firms as revealed through the impact 
of disturbance on their accounting information systems. 
In relation to the business operations element of accounting information 
systems we discovered that processes of selling and purchasing, managing debtors 
and creditors and paying employees, were highly vulnerable to the effects of 
hyperinflation. Across the board, initial adaptations were centered on sales and 
                                                             
119 Examples of a continuous cost reporting include Degussa, E. Merck, Gutehoffnungshütte und Carl 
Zeiss. 
120 For example, Firmenarchiv Evonik Industries, Bestand Degussa AG, 
Geschäftsbericht/Jahresabschluss 1919/1920/1921, 1922/23. 
121 For example, BASF Unternehmensarchiv, sig. A.8.4./7. 
122 Sanofi-Hoechst Archiv, sig. H0120066. 
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procurement activities, as evidenced by frequent amendments to terms and conditions, 
and the use of a variety of currencies in calculating values in these contracts. At the 
height of the crisis, the focus shifted to remunerating labor. Frequent and flexible 
adjustments to payment contracts, cycles and methods ensured the retention of the 
workforce. 
In relation to the transactions processing element of accounting information 
systems we found evidence of disorder and errors in calculative activity, and delays or 
the cessation of certain recording tasks. The testimony of accounting and clerical 
employees referred to the unbearable burdens placed upon them by hyperinflation. 
Here, we discovered limitations to adaptability, especially at the height of the crisis. 
Firms tended to respond by reallocating corporate resources. They devoted 
significantly more labor to the performance of those activities that were essential to 
the continuation of the business. In particular, the economic and social consequences 
of failing to remunerate employees expeditiously were such that firms expended 
considerable effort on maintaining payroll activity. It would appear that paying 
workers was deemed more important than accurate and timely accounting for wages 
and other expenses. We also observed some industry variation. In banks, where firms 
responded by substantially increasing the supply of labor devoted to calculation and 
recording, adaptability in transaction processing was more evident than in some non-
financial entities.  
As to the control element of accounting information systems we found that 
corporations were especially vulnerable to the effects of hyperinflation in relation to 
the handling and processing of physical cash. Such sensitivity was further heightened 
by the need to maintain essential business operations. The evidence suggests that 
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entities, including some banks, had a limited capacity to adapt their control 
environment at the height of the crisis, because of physical constraints in handling 
masses of cash, an insurmountable volume of transactions to process, and the need to 
perform complex calculations manually. The deficiencies this situation revealed were 
often addressed only after the storm had passed.  
Measurement and disclosure practices in financial (external) reporting were 
highly sensitive to the effects of rapidly changing price levels. Firms initially adapted 
by providing supplementary information in their financial statements. However, the 
production of ‘meaningless’ numbers in balance sheets, the failure to publish annual 
accounts, delays in the same, and reduced levels of disclosure, suggest a limited 
ability to adapt to the hyperinflationary environment. The lack of regulatory guidance 
did not help the situation. Nonetheless, certain entities maintained the continuity of 
financial reporting by devoting additional resources to it early in the crisis, and by 
preparing financial statements on the basis of alternative currencies. In relation to 
managerial (internal) reporting entities responded to the disruption by focusing on 
data relating to physical quantities and productivity rather than monetary measures, 
and by suspending analysis in inflation-impacted ‘abnormal’ years. Although such 
adaptations represented departures from certain accounting conventions they did offer 
meaningful bases for managerial decision-making.  
The study has indicated the diverse experiences of hyperinflation in various 
sectors and firms. While firm size does not appear to have been a major factor in 
determining response to the disturbance, banks appear to have managed the crisis by 
significantly increasing the supply of accounting labor. We have seen cases of 
individual entities that expeditiously and determinately attempted to address the threat 
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posed by rapidly rising prices to specific accounting activities. It is also clear that 
adapting to the effects of the disturbance became more difficult over time. As the 
crisis reached its zenith in the second half of 1923 all elements of the accounting 
information systems came under considerable pressure and were severely tested in all 
firms examined.  
(TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE) 
Our investigation of accounting information systems during a period of crisis 
suggests that German corporations did exhibit a strong capacity to adapt to the effects 
of hyperinflation. They adapted in a pragmatic fashion as the crisis accelerated (see 
Table 1). Experimenting with a number of possible responses to the disturbance, the 
key adaptation was to devote greater human resources to everyday operations that 
were essential to business survival such as trading, servicing debtors and creditors, 
and remunerating labor. Such responses invariably pointed to the ability of their 
systems to recover, survive, and return to a pre-crisis state. But it is also apparent that 
the hyperinflation could result in system adaptations that represented positive change. 
Some corporations responded to the crisis by improving specific elements of 
accounting information systems, such as their internal controls or financial reporting 
practices, by reducing complexity and focusing on essential activities and information 
needs. While hyperinflation had a severely disruptive impact on accounting 
information systems, in individual entities it could also inspire innovation and 
advancement once the trauma had passed.  
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Appendix. Archival Sources 
Collection name Abbreviated firm name 
Industry 
classification 
Reference 
code Repository Location 
August Thyssen 
Hütte Gewerkschaft August Thyssen Hütte Basic Resources A 
ThyssenKrupp 
Konzernarchiv Duisburg 
Automobilwerke H. 
Büssing AG - Manufacturing N/A 
MAN Historisches 
Archiv Munich 
Badische Anilin 
und Sodafabrik 
Ludwigshafen 
(BASF) 
BASF Chemical N/A BASF Unternehmensarchiv Ludwigshafen 
Bayerische 
Motorenwerke AG 
Bayerische 
Motorenwerke Manufacturing UA 
BMW AG 
Konzernarchiv Munich 
Benzol-Vereinigung 
GmbH/Benzol-
Verband GmbH 
Benzol-
Vereinigung/Benzol-
Verband 
Chemical A Historisches Archiv BP/Aral Bochum 
C.A.F. Kahlbaum 
Chemische Fabrik - Chemical B0 
Schering Archiv/Bayer 
AG Berlin 
Carl Zeiss AG Carl Zeiss Manufacturing BACZ Firmenarchiv Carl Zeiss Jena Jena 
Chemische Fabrik 
auf Actien (vorm. 
E. Schering) 
- Chemical B0 Schering Archiv/Bayer AG Berlin 
Chemische Fabrik 
von Heyden AG 
Chemische Fabrik von 
Heyden Chemical 
U 107 
(AWD) 
Sächsisches 
Wirtschaftsarchiv Leipzig 
Commerz- und 
Privatbank AG and 
associates 
- Banking 400 Commerzbank Historisches Archiv 
Frankfurt am 
Main 
Deutsch-
Luxemburgische 
Bergwerks- und 
Hüttenaktiengesells
chaft 
- Basic Resources DHHU, FWH 
ThyssenKrupp 
Konzernarchiv, Hoesch 
Archiv und Stiftung zur 
Industriegeschichte 
Thyssen 
Duisburg 
Deutsche Bank AG 
and associates - Banking N/A 
Historisches Institut der 
Deutschen Bank 
Frankfurt am 
Main 
Deutsche Gold- und 
Silberscheideanstalt 
(Degussa) AG 
Degussa Metals Degussa Evonik Industries AG Corporate Archives Hanau 
Deutsche 
Kugellagerfabrik 
GmbH Leipzig 
Deutsche 
Kugellagerfabrik Manufacturing U 63 
Sächsisches 
Wirtschaftsarchiv Leipzig 
Dresdner Bank AG - Banking 500 Commerzbank Frankfurt am 
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and associates Historisches Archiv Main 
E. Merck Darmstadt E. Merck Pharmaceuticals N/A Merck Konzernarchiv Darmstadt 
Eisen- und 
Stahlwerk Hoesch 
AG 
Hoesch Metals H 
ThyssenKrupp 
Konzernarchiv, Hoesch 
Archiv 
Duisburg 
Farbenfabriken 
vorm. Fr. Bayer & 
Co. Leverkusen 
Bayer Chemical BAL Bayer AG Corporate History & Archives Leverkusen 
Farbwerke Hoechst 
AG (vorm. Meister 
Lucius & Brüning) 
Hoechst Chemical H Sanofi-Hoechst Archiv Kelsterbach 
Friedrich Krupp AG 
(and subsidiaries) Fried. Krupp AG Metals WA, FAH 
Historisches Archiv 
Krupp Essen 
Gutehoffnungshütte 
Oberhausen 
Aktienverein/AG 
(and subsidiaries) 
Gutehoffnungshütte Basic Resources/Metals Abt. 130 
Stiftung Rheinisch 
Westfälisches 
Wirtschaftsarchiv zu 
Köln 
Cologne 
IG Farbenwerke 
(member firms) - Chemical BAL 
Bayer AG Corporate 
History & Archives Leverkusen 
Kaffee Handels-
Aktiengesellschaft 
(HAG) 
Kaffee HAG Food N/A Mondelez International Archiv  Bremen 
Kammerich-Werke 
AG  Kammerich-Werke Metals M 
Salzgitter 
Konzernarchiv  
Mülheim an der 
Ruhr 
Kübler & 
Niethammer 
Papierfabrik 
Kübler & Niethammer Manufacturing U 47 Sächsisches Wirtschaftsarchiv Leipzig 
Mannesmannröhren
-Werke  - Metals M 
Salzgitter 
Konzernarchiv  
Mülheim an der 
Ruhr 
Maschinenfabrik 
Augsburg-Nürnberg 
(MAN) AG 
MAN Manufacturing N/A MAN Historisches Archiv 
Augsburg and 
Munich 
Oberschlesische 
Kokswerke - Basic Resources B0 
Schering Archiv/Bayer 
AG Berlin 
Phoenix AG - Metals R Salzgitter Konzernarchiv  
Mülheim an der 
Ruhr 
Rheinische 
Stahlwerke 
Duisburg-Meiderich 
AG 
Rheinische 
Stahlwerke Duisburg-
Meiderich 
Metals RSW ThyssenKrupp Konzernarchiv Duisburg 
Schering Chemical 
Works - Chemical B2 
Schering Archiv/Bayer 
AG Berlin 
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Stahlfinanzierungs 
GmbH  - Metals P 
Salzgitter 
Konzernarchiv  
Mülheim an der 
Ruhr 
Th. Goldschmidt 
AG Th. Goldschmidt Chemical N/A 
Evonik Industries AG 
Corporate Archives Marl 
Thyssen & Co.  - Metals R Salzgitter Konzernarchiv  
Mülheim an der 
Ruhr 
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Table 1. Timeline of Inflation and Adaptations to Accounting Information Systems, 1922-1923 
  German Paper-mark to 
US Dollar Exchange 
Rate 
  
Month  Business Operations Transaction Processing  Control  Financial Reporting  Managerial Reporting 
January 1922 45.69           
February 1922 49.51 Initial experimenting with 
payment terms and foreign 
currencies in sales and 
procurement contracts 
        
March 1922 67.70     Supplementing reports with 
conversions to foreign currencies or 
gold-mark, disclosure of disclaimers 
on the limited usefulness of 
financial reporting 
  
April 1922 69.32       
May 1922 69.11       
June 1922 75.62       Suspension of current 
monetary reporting, replaced 
by pre-war or foreign 
currencies; increased reliance 
on quantities and productivity 
measures 
July 1922 117.49       
August 1922 270.26       
September 1922 349.18       
October 1922 757.73       
November 1922 1,711.08   Relocating corporate 
(human) resources to 
transaction processing 
  Suspension of information, banks 
use fixed reminder values for almost 
all non-financial assets December 1922 1,807.83     
January 1923 4,281.00 Regular adjustments of sales 
and procurement contracts to 
compensate for inflationary 
effects 
Increasing complexity of 
inscriptions (additional 
notes, columns, sub-
calculations, different ink 
colors) 
  Delaying reports or reducing 
the amount and complexity of 
information February 1923 6,650.00   
March 1923 5,048.00   
April 1923 5,826.00     
May 1923 11,355.00 Focus on wage and salary 
adjustments, accelerating 
frequency, use of in lieu 
  
June 1923 26,202.00   
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July 1923 84,186.00 compensation (Notgeld, 
vouchers, goods) 
Increasing frequency of 
payroll and payment cycles 
  
August 1923 1,100,632.00 Suspension of some controls, 
allocating better skilled and 
more trusted personnel to 
operating controls, adding 
control layers 
September 1923 23,549,000.00 Simplification and 
suspension of book entries  
Suspension of reporting elements, 
aggregating information, delaying 
disclosure October 1923 6,017,000,000.00 
November 1923 522,286,000,000.00 
Sources: Statistisches Reichsamt (1925), pp. 6-10; own analysis.
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Figure 1. Extract from E. Merck’s General Ledger, 1923  
 
(Source: Merck-Archiv, sig. S1/54). 
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Figure 2. Extract from Thyssen & Co.’s internal value creation calculation, May 1923  
 
 
(Source: Salzgitter Konzernarchiv, sig. R 2.35.13.3). 
